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Abstract 
This paper aims to discuss the root causes of terrorism, which might be political 
systems and political administration and policies. It debates that without knowing the 
root cause of terrorism, there will be no plausible solution to the problem. Further, 
the paper tries to prove that the root causes of terrorism might not be economic, 
social, ideological or beliefs and religions. The core theme of terrorism can be 
injustice that is product of the political system and its activities. Therefore, the 
political system and decision-making are the root cause of terrorism. In short, this 
means that any suggestions to solve the problem of terrorism will not be successful 
unless they address the political system.   
Keywords: Terrorism, prevention of terrorism, the root causes, democracy, wealth, 
justice, injustice. 
1. Introduction 
People are not born terrorists and do not wake up one morning and 
suddenly decide to start planting bombs in public streets. Therefore, an 
important realisation here is that terrorism is a process and ‘terrorism is a 
choice; it is a political strategy selected from among a range of options’ 
(Silke, 1998). The process of terrorism has an historical background, which 
involves people who rightly or wrongly perceive that the political system is 
treating them harshly. This harsh treatment may even stretch back to their 
ancestors. 
Terrorists may come from any country and any culture. Terrorism is a 
complex problem and its origins are diverse and, as Franks says, ‘the study 
of terrorism has become preoccupied with the constant debate that revolves 
around explaining what actually constitutes terrorism and how to counter it. 
Instead of perhaps concentrating on why it actually occurs’ (Franks, 2006).  
Political actions can take any number of forms. However, one of the 
most radical forms of political violence is terrorism, and it is differentiated 
from the other forms of political violence. The differentiation is not 
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completely understood by academics and practitioners, because there are 
different explanations about the origins of violence. 
What justifies, supports violence, and causes grievances? Is it 
background conditions, such as political, social, cultural, economic and 
psychological issues, that cause those people to carry out terrorist atrocities? 
Alternatively, will focusing on these give relatively little explanation of the 
subject? What is the best way to explain terrorism?  
Whatever the answer is an examination of the root causes of terrorism 
will make an important contribution to the studies of terrorism in terms of 
understanding terrorism, and thereby help that students to design a model for 
countering it.  As Richardson writes, ‘understanding is the first step towards 
formulating an effective counter-terrorist strategy’ (Richardson, 2006). 
Moreover, terrorism can never be efficiently combated unless its causes are 
more systematically studied and addressed’ (Mazrui, 2007). Therefore, this 
paper aims to enhance that understanding of terrorism. 
Initially, the political roots of terrorism will be studied. In this paper, 
political violence and civil disobedience will be investigated in order to 
establish whether there is a link between these and terrorism.   
The exploration of the political roots of 20th-century political violence 
might be an important factor in terrorism, because there should be some 
similarities between political violence in general and terrorism more 
specifically. The study will include the causes of, and justifications for, 
political violence. In addition, civil disobedience will also be investigated in 
this part in order to establish if there is a link with terrorism.  
This paper will try to reach a conclusion which will demonstrate that 
terrorism is the product of political systems1, resulting when a political 
system cannot meet the demand of terrorists or some other political actors 
within the establishment. Then, terrorists will be shown as political actors in 
the political system and the country.  
Secondly, economic and social roots will be inspected for possible 
causes of terrorism. Radio, television and newspapers inform us that there 
are very close links between economic and social conditions and terrorism. 
It would be a mistake not to overlook what these three forms of media are 
saying.  
Thirdly, philosophical, ideological and religious roots will be 
considered. It is important to discover the ideologies, culture, and 
religious beliefs that might have any impact on the causes of terrorism. 
Psychological roots which may attempt to understand the motivations 
and actions of terrorist individuals and groups will also be studied, taking 
into account the enormous diversity of theories and the fact that no single 
                                                 
1  Any political system is part of culture of that society. Then ‘cultures differ in how they react to a sense of 
injustice. Some may lean towards correction and compensation; others may be provoked into an urge for 
retaliation. Some cultural rage may demand reparations; other forms of indignation may dream of revenge’ 
(Mazrui, 2007). 
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psychological theory, and no single field of scholarly study, is able fully 
to comprehend these roots and whether they have any impact on 
terrorists’ actions (Leeman, 1987, 45-53). 
Finally, a conclusion will be drawn in order to stress the important 
points once more. This will state once again that the main root cause of 
terrorism is not poverty, ideology, or psychological problems, but the 
failure of political systems.   
2. The root causes approach 
It was noted that some authors believe that an approach to counter-
terrorism based on addressing the root causes of terrorism may be counter-
productive.  The fear is that tackling the grievances which causes terrorism 
will be seen as weakness, and so encourage more terrorism. Dershowitz, in 
particular, comments that ‘the real root cause of terrorism is that it is 
successful – terrorists have consistently benefited from their terrorist acts. … 
terrorism will persist … as long as the international community rewards it’ 
(Dershowitz, 2002: 2). It would be wrong, however, to reject the root causes 
approach because of this fear. Understanding why people resort to terrorism 
is an essential prerequisite for determining how to respond. As Pape notes, 
for instance, ‘understanding that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to 
foreign occupation rather than the product of Islamic fundamentalism has 
important implications for how the United States and its allies should 
conduct the war on terrorism’(Pape, 2005: 237). 
Responding to the root causes of terrorism does not, in any event, 
necessarily mean that surrendering to terrorist demands.  In a recent report 
published by Demos, Briggs et al. comment about the attraction of British 
Muslims to Al Qaeda that, ‘while factors such as foreign policy and the 
Middle East are important, they will have no traction unless they can be 
linked to sources of grievance and anger closer to home, such as the poverty 
and discrimination suffered by the Muslim community in the UK’ (Briggs et 
al., 2006: 40).  If this is true, then much can be done to eliminate these 
grievances, and so reduce support for terrorism, without making concessions 
to the demands of the terrorists.  Refusal to accept that ‘the grievances of the 
Muslim community … in many instances … are well founded and deserve 
to be recognised’ (Briggs et al., 2006: 16) alienates members of the 
community from government and from the police and makes them less 
likely to cooperate with security and intelligence forces. Although, the 
intelligence services, which is an important part of security forces in 
combating terrorism, in turn rely on information provided by local 
communities. Alienation of this sort therefore makes it much more difficult 
to combat terrorism in the manner proposed.  While ‘there are dangers 
linked to policy change in response to terrorist demands’, the British 
government, says the Demos report, ‘must get over its hang-ups about 
responding to the grievances’ (Briggs et al., 2006: 48, 59).  
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In short, terrorism will continue until the root causes are addressed. As 
Homer-Dixon (2007) argues, ‘until we understand the sources of terrorism 
and do something about them, we can arm ourselves to the teeth, rampage 
across the planet with our militaries, suspend many of our civil liberties, and 
still not protect ourselves from this menace’(Homer-Dixon, 2007; Zimbardo, 
2001).  
3. The root causes of terrorism 
In this study, I perceive and consider terrorism ‘as a response’ to the 
existing political system. In other words, terrorism is seen as political and as 
politically motivated actions.  ‘It is a strategy rooted in political discontent, 
used in the service of many different beliefs and doctrines that help 
legitimise and sustain violence. Ideologies associated with nationalism, 
revolution, religion, and defence of the status quo have all inspired 
terrorism’ (Leeman, 1987: 45-53). In sum, ‘terrorists fight for very different 
reasons’ (Richardson, 2006). These are mainly political and interconnected.    
The causes of terrorism can be investigated under these sub-headings:  
1) Historical and political roots; 
2) Economic and social roots;  
3) Ideological and religious roots;  
4. Psychological roots 
4.1. Historical roots 
It has been accepted that political violence, conflict, and terrorism are 
old phenomena. Hence, ‘the history of terror is unfortunately part of the 
humankind's history of executing political power, as force by the use of fear 
and violence has always been part of our history’ (Leeman, 1987).  The term 
‘terrorism’ dates back to the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution 
in 1793-4 (Wilkinson, 1974: 129). However, the phenomenon developed its 
current meaning in the 20th century. By the 1980s, organizations such as the 
Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Red 
Brigades of Italy were classified as ‘terrorist’, and since then this term has 
developed much more. Until the 1980s, the term ‘terrorism’ was not always 
used; the terms ‘political violence’ (Davis, 2007) and ‘anarchism’2 were also 
used in order to explain terrorism.  
A recent study investigates the historical pattern of terrorism in the 
world political system, and the study provides some interesting finding 
about the relationship between terrorism and the world system of politics 
and political systems. This is briefly explained in Table 1 (see Bergesen and 
Lizardo, 2007). 
                                                 
2  ‘The anarchists who performed acts of violence at that time were motivated by the belief that the state was 
an instrument of oppression directed against the poor and the downtrodden’ (Wilkins, 1992: 1). 
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There is a clear link between political systems and terrorism. This 
suggests that terrorism is a product of political systems and will not go away 
before those systems are corrected. At present, ‘(t)errorism can be 
interpreted as a desperate response of the growing number of weak or 
powerless groups challenging the rigidities of frontiers, power and resource 
distribution underpinned by the current international system’(Wilkinson, 
1977: 30). The current international system is seen as unfair and unjust by 
many whom ‘see themselves as defending the weak against strong and 
punishing the strong for their violation of all moral codes’(Richardson, 
2006: 59). This has produced the so-called ‘new terrorism’.  
4.2. Political roots 
Terrorism is like a cancer cell of the existing political system. If the 
political system works perfectly, this cancer cell will not be visible within 
the political system; if the system does not work perfectly, it will be visible, 
grow, and spread into the whole political system (Çınar, 1997: 247). 
Wilkinson agrees with the present writer, although in a slightly different 
approach. He states that ‘revolutionary violence stems directly from 
conflicts within and between a country’s political institutions.  
Revolutionary violence is seen as the product of conflict about 
legitimacy, political rights, and access to power. It often results from the 
refusal or incapacity of a government to meet certain claims made upon it by 
a powerful group or a coalition of group (Wilkinson, 1974).  
Table 1  
Political Systems and Waves of Terrorism 
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Examination of an existing political system and its governance will 
provide the required information about the root causes of terrorism. When 
one is investigating the existing political system, one should start to 
investigate and analyse it at least from 40 years before the present day. For 
example, ethnic terrorism may be a product of a ‘nation-state’3 because 
nationalism means that the dominant ethnic groups in the country have been 
prized above others, who have been subordinated in the country’s political, 
economic and social life for a prolonged period. ‘Without question, in the 
most successful revolutionary wars of the last 25 years, the strongest appeal 
has been to nationalism and patriotism based either on resistance to a 
conqueror or the gaining of independence from a colonial 
power’(Wilkinson,1974). Today, it is difficult to see any colonial power in 
any country, but many ethnic groups within the nation-state see the 
dominant ethnic group or government as a colonial power or occupying 
power. For example, ‘the PKK claims it is only acting in self-defense and 
for the protection of the Kurds’.4    
In addition to seeing terrorism as the product of the nation-state, one 
may see it, in the Middle East for instance, as a product of the political 
systems of repressive regimes5, economic systems which are corrupted and 
produce poverty and no job opportunities, educational systems which are 
lacking in decent education and training, and the never-ending conflict in 
Muslim world in general and in particular the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.  
Sharansky argues that 9/11 ‘has dispelled the free world of its illusions and 
democratic policymakers recognise that the price for “stability” inside a 
nondemocratic regimes is terror outside of it’ (Sharansky, 2006: 14).  
Another type of political system, which is relevant, is the international 
system, in particular the current balance of power. One Middle Eastern 
academic states that ‘Now, there are some injustices in the Middle East. 
There is at the same time an imbalance of power in the Middle East. There is 
the occupation of Palestine, the invasions of Iraq, Afghanistan, of Chechnya, 
Kashmir. What you call suicide bombs is something related to the imbalance 
of power. When a partner has all the weapons and the other partner has 
nothing, except his life to offer, then he will sacrifice his life’(Mollov, 
                                                 
3 ‘Nation-states exist to deliver political goods-security, education, health services, economic opportunity, 
environmental surveillance, a legal frame-work of order and a judicial system to administer it, and 
fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities-to their citizens’ 
(Rotberg, 2002). Further, ‘(a) form of state in which those who exercise power claim legitimacy for their 
rule partly or solely on the grounds that their power is exercised for the promotion of the distinctive 
interests, values and cultural heritage of a particular nation whose members ideally would constitute all, or 
most of, its subject population and all of whom would dwell within the borders’ (Johnson, 2007).  
4   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers_Party, accessed on 15 Mar. 07. 
5  ‘The region has been dominated by a range of authoritarian political systems, including military regimes, 
monarchies, theocracies, and one-party statist regimes. … Civil society is weak as a result of the severe 
legal restrictions and coercive methods that the region’s regimes use to stifle political expression. 
Independent media are largely nonexistent; most newspapers and articles are censored, and those that exist 
are seen as serving the interests of the regime or particular political parties. In such societies, severe 
repression drives all politics underground, placing the moderate opposition at a disadvantage and 
encouraging political extremism’ (Windsor, 2003). 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 99 
2005).  The power of America and its foreign policy may be seen causes of 
terrorism. Since the collapse of super power rivalry, the United States acts 
when and where it sees such action as fitting its interests. President Bush 
states ‘these terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a 
way of life.  With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, 
retreating from the world and forsaking our friends.  They stand against us, 
because we stand in their way’.6 However, it is not right to claim that those 
terrorists aimed to disrupt the way of life of the USA. They aimed to give 
their message to the administration of America by showing that they were 
not happy with American political, economic and military presence in the 
Middle East. For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri states that ‘the masters in 
Washington and Tel Aviv are using the regimes (such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Jordan) to protect their interests and to fight the battle against the 
Muslim on their behalf’(Richardson, 2006). Laqueur seems to be affirming 
this statement as ‘the resentments felt by Muslims against the dominant 
position of the West politically, culturally, and economically, and the 
stagnant state of Muslim societies’(Laqueur, 1996).  
It is assumed that a very small number of individuals are present in 
every country that is ready to take a form of political action against those 
government decisions, which cause unhappiness to them. These people may 
or may not represent collective interests, but they encourage other people to 
listen and understand their starting point. When others begin to listen to 
them, a formation of political actions will start. One of these political actions 
is terrorism. It is clear that terrorism requires the active participation of these 
kinds of unhappy people. Thus, the action of terrorism is an end product of 
the process. This process moves through several stages until the overt 
terrorist action takes place. Only, at the action stage of terrorism does it 
become noticeable and be named by people. From the initial genesis of 
terrorism to the action itself, each individual stage requires careful 
determination and planning. Accordingly, terrorism has many dimensions 
and each dimension needs to be dealt with carefully in order to understand 
and prevent it. 
Sometimes terrorism is associated with a social movement or political 
party that enjoys significant popular support, largely because of its non-
violent activities such as providing much-needed social services (Hamas and 
Hezbollah are examples of such implanted organisations). Such actors 
employ terrorism because it is a temporarily expedient means of pressuring a 
government. They can survive; even flourish, without using terrorism. Other 
groups are more socially isolated. They may be splinter factions of larger 
organizations, or small groups that have formed in order to use terrorism. 
Such groups have few options other than terrorism and over time, it may 
become an identity for them as much as a strategy. Groups of both types are 
                                                 
6  President Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol, 
Washington, D.C. For Immediate Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 20, 2001.  
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subject to internal strains and divisions, and factionalism is common. Their 
leaders struggle to maintain cohesion and loyalty. 
Introducing this distinction raises another point: in some 
circumstances, terrorism may be seen as legitimate by popular audiences, 
especially when they are it is discriminated against and access to power is 
blocked. It cannot be denied that in some circumstances the public may not 
only support the goals behind terrorism but the method itself 
(Crenshaw,2005). 
Without support of the public for the goals behind terrorism and the 
method, terrorists cannot successfully engage in any terrorist activities. 
When I look at the action of terrorists, I see two important elements. One is 
the terrorists who carry out the atrocity and the other is those giving support.  
This second set of people may not be actual members of a terrorist group, 
but their provision of support is still a part of terrorism. This support can be 
in the form of money, goods, media and other categories. 
4.3. Civil disobedience  
It is a known fact that any political decision will leave certain people 
unsatisfied. These unsatisfied people will show their none-satisfaction in 
different forms because they feel that they are conflict with the decision 
makers. As sated that ‘conflict between the desires of different individuals is 
a necessary condition of politics’ (Warner and Crisp, 1990). Hence, there are 
several types of political resistance and one of them is terrorism which ‘is 
one of the forms which sometimes quite tiny groups may use to attack even 
the most stable liberal states, those enjoying a high degree of popular 
support and legitimacy’(Wilkinson, 1977).  Another form of resistance is 
civil disobedience. 
Civil disobedience is often an effective means of changing laws and 
protecting liberties. It also embodies an important moral concept that there 
are times when law and justice do not coincide and that to obey the law at 
such times can be an abdication of ethical responsibility. The choice of civil 
disobedience and non-cooperation is not for everyone. We all choose to do 
what feels right to us personally (Starr, 1998).  
Wilkinson says that ‘civil disobedience on a large scale becomes 
revolutionary when it is used to overthrow an existing system and establish a 
revolutionary regime, and when it is employed to coerce opposing and 
uncommitted elements into submitting to the revolutionary will’ (Wilkinson, 
1977). This statement indicates that there can be a link between civil 
disobedience and terrorism that targets the existing system and seeks to 
replace it with another regime. 
One writer states that ‘when a person's conscience and the laws clash, 
that person must follow his or her conscience. The stress on personal 
conscience and on the need to act now rather than to wait for legal change is 
a recurring element in civil disobedience movements’(Thoreau, 1849; Starr, 
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1998). The disobedience can appear in the form of terrorism, sub-revolution, 
and revolution, which is definitely the most extreme form of disobedience. 
In this situation, parties dispute the legitimacy of their action. Neither 
terrorists nor statesmen believe that the other party’s action is legitimate.  
According to the theory of frustration-aggression, ‘humans only 
become violent if they are frustrated in their efforts to attain a particular 
goal: severe frustration leads to anger and anger to acts of aggressive 
violence’ (Wilkinson, 1977). This theory ‘maintains that aggression is 
always a consequence of frustration’ (Tay et al., 2007). Frustration is 
‘resulting from unfulfilled needs or unresolved problems’.7 These are ‘since 
ancient times, worsening deprivation, injustice or oppression’ which can be 
seen ‘major precondition of political violence’(Wilkinson, 1977).   
4.4. Political violence   
One of these forms is political violence whic is an extreme way of 
showing the conflict. Historically, ‘the use of violence to effect political 
change is a generalized phenomenon around the world’ (Boix, 2004).  
What is violence? The word ’violence8’ obviously concerns a great 
variety of social phenomena. One assumes, however, is that the meaning of 
the word ‘violence’ is vague (Chwe, 2001). In general, terms violence is a 
product of an individual or group who acts unilaterally in order to impose its 
opinion, and there is no space for negotiation because the power of each side 
is not equal. The action may harm the body, life, future, or plans of the 
others. The violence can be linked to specific places and times. It can be 
sustained and reproduced in social structures. Violence is unwanted physical 
interference with the bodies of others, such that they experience pain and 
mental anguish and, in the extreme case, death – violence, in a word – is the 
greatest enemy of democracy as we know it. Violence is anathema to its 
spirit and substance. This follows, almost by definition, because democracy, 
considered as a set of institutions and as a way of life, is a non-violent 
means of equally apportioning and publicly monitoring power within and 
among overlapping communities of people who live according to a wide 
variety of morals (Keane, 2004: 1).  
Davis says that ‘violence is shown to be negatively related to the 
availability of alternative means of acquiring political goods and to the 
availability of alternative economic opportunities’ (Davis, 2007).  
Political violence can involve violations of human rights in the 
society. It occurs whenever the expected net gains from employing it exceed 
                                                 
7  Random House Webster’s Dictionary. 
8  ‘Violence is a common means used by people and governments around the world to achieve political goals. 
Many groups and individuals believe that their political systems will never respond to their political 
demands. As a result they believe that violence is not only justified but also necessary in order to achieve 
their political objectives. By the same token, many governments around the world believe they need to use 
violence in order to intimidate their populace into acquiescence. At other times, governments use force in 
order to defend their country from outside invasion or other threats of force’ (in 
http://polisci.nelson.com/violence.html, accessed on 28 May 2007). 
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the net gains derived from accepting the status quo among some political 
actors (such as unions, peasant organizations, a clique of army officers and 
so on). The status quo is here defined as a situation in which either a section 
of society holds the (public) monopoly of violence and policymaking 
uncontested by those that are excluded from the decision-making process or 
political differences are settled peacefully (through either voting procedures 
or bargaining) among all parties in contention. The decision to engage in 
violent activities is a function of two factors. First, violence becomes more 
likely as the difference between the benefits accrued under a new regime 
obtained through the use of violence and the gains obtained under the status 
quo increases. Second, the occurrence of political violence declines as its 
costs go up (Boix, 2004).  
Table 2  
Some Explanations of the Origins of Violence 
Variables Structural Conjuctural explanation 
Economic Economic inequalities Intermediate steps in the economic 
growth 
Social Social cleavages Rapid modernisation 
Political Authoritarian regimes Crisis of repressive apparatuses 
Cultural Tradition of violent 
conflict 
Rapid changes in the value system 
 
Political violence becomes unavoidable in an unequal society in which 
assets are not distributed fairly among people. Then, the potential rebels can 
apply violence to overturn the existing political and economic system (Boix, 
2004).  Porta draws a table (Table 2) in order to show some explanations 
about the origins of violence. These are the structural conditions, such as 
‘the level of societal development, the strength of ethnic or class cleavages, 
the repressiveness of a regime, and cultural traditions’; and what Porta calls 
the ‘conjunctural’ explanation, which relates to ‘the intermediate stages of 
economic development, the crises of modernization, period of ineffective 
state coercion, and rapid cultural changes’ (Porta, 1995: 5). 
Whether the structural or the conjunctural explanation has more to say 
about political violence and terrorism, the essential characteristic of politics 
itself requires ‘conflict between the desires of different individuals’ (Warner 
and Crisp, 1990) that helps to find a right balance in the society. This 
explanation leads us to look at ‘socio-economic factors that can potentially 
contribute to the manifestation of violence, such as social dislocation, 
urbanisation, modernisation, immigration, unemployment and poverty’ 
(Franks, 2006).  
When such a dispute involves disagreement about the appropriate 
source of legitimation the conflict may be more than usually intractable, for 
the standard democratic procedure of majority vote by the legitimating 
‘people’ (vox populi, vox Dei) is fatally flawed when the question at issue is 
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who ‘the people’ are. The more intractable the dispute the more likely, other 
things being equal, that dissent will take illegal or terroristic forms (Warner 
and Crisp, 1990). Further, one of the aims of the use of political violence 
(Davis, 2007; Wilkinson 1977) is to alter the political and economic status 
quo, because this is seen as maintaining injustice and unfairness. The 
injustice and unfairness are subjective not objective and these are reflections 
of the perceptions of people who claim to be suffering from them.  They are 
also relative not absolute. However, this idea will be examined within the 
‘the deprivation theory of civil violence’9 which suggests that ‘political 
violence results from the social frustration that occurs in the wake of relative 
deprivation’10. Individuals or group may feel that the deprivation causes the 
problem, and the use of violence ‘becomes more attractive to those that are 
excluded from the state apparatus– the prize of victory raises with 
inequality’ (Boix, 2004). 
Identifying and analysing forms of violence and responses to forms of 
violence requires one to focus on the role of representation, sovereignty, and 
identity in conflict, as well as the role of the state system in reconstructing 
some of the essential conditions of asymmetric warfare. Without analysing 
the implications of the root causes and nature of the peace and order 
important elements of the violence, one cannot reach a proper result on 
identifying the violence.  
In Table 3 forms of violence and responses are shown. There is a very 
thin line between peace and war. This line consists of political systems and 
politicians. If the politicians do not react properly in response to political 
problems, they will make it more difficult to keep the peace.  This is also the 
case in the international system, in which states and international politicians 
become the main actors who represent that thin line. If they have tended to 
draw on similar simple definitional categories to define and legitimate their 
responses, they will inflame the political activities of the others, thereby 
creating more problems. These others may often gain a degree of support 
and legitimacy when people see their grievances in the media and in public 
debate (Richmond, 2003).  
In the following Table 4, different levels of political conflict are 
shown and distinguished. The table lists state actors and non-state actors in 
opposition and gives their politics as mirror images. If the political system is 
not a liberal democratic system, then the opposition may not be in a position 
to  express  its ideas  and  alternative  as  much as those holding state power.  
                                                 
9  Wilkinson (1974: 126). He states that ‘there are at least four models of relative deprivation: rising 
expectations may overtake rising capability; capabilities may remain static while expectation rise; general 
socio-economic malaise may actually bring about a drop in capabilities while expectations remain constant; 
and finally there is the classic J-curve phenomenon in which, for a period, capabilities keep pace with rising 
expectations and then suddenly drop behind’. 
10 Davis (2007). He states that ‘(r)elative deprivation is said to occur when the outcomes experienced by 
individuals are inferior to those that: a) they expected to receive or b) felt that they were entitled to receive. 
It is the inconsistency between outcomes and expectations and/or the prevalence of outcomes that are 
regarded as unjust that constitutes relative deprivation’. 
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Table 3  
The Conflict and Response Spectrum* 
 
*See Richmond (2003). 
 
This could lead it to respond on a different level. If the state actors respond 
in turn with the use of force, this might be countered with force of a similar 
nature. Sharansky argues that ‘the lack of freedom in many parts of the 
world that was the greatest threat to peace and stability’(Dermer, 2006: xii). 
This idea led President Bush to adopt a doctrine known as the Bush 
Doctrine,11 but some academics have criticised it.  In the context of the 
Middle East, for instance, Gause states that ‘there is no reason to believe that 
a move toward more democracy in Arab states would deflect them from 
their course. And there is no reason to believe that they could not recruit 
followers in more democratic Arab states -- especially if those states 
continued to have good relations with the United States, made peace with 
Israel, and generally behaved in ways acceptable to Washington’(Gause III, 
2007).  However, keeping the political structure of the Middle East as it is 
will not obviously solve the problem.  As Sharansky says, ‘I am convinced 
that all peoples desire to be free. I am convinced that freedom anywhere will 
make the world safer everywhere’ (Sharansky, 2006). Without freedom of 
choice, expression and belief, security is not possible. Throughout history,  
                                                 
11 The Bush Doctrine is name given to a set of foreign policy guidelines first unveiled by President George W. 
Bush in his commencement speech to the graduating class of West Point given on June 1, 2002. The 
policies, taken together, outlined a broad new phase in US policy that would place greater emphasis on 
military pre-emption, military superiority ("strength beyond challenge"), unilateral action, and a 
commitment to "extending democracy, liberty, and security to all regions". The policy was formalized in a 
document titled The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published on September 
20, 2002. 
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Table 4  
Political Actions v. Political Opposition* 
State of Peace  
State Actor  Non-state Actor  
Conventional Politics  
I. Rule of Law (Routinised rule, 
legitimated by tradition, customs, 
constitutional procedures) 
I. Opposition politics (Lobbying among 
power holders, formation of opposition 
press and parties, rallies, electoral 
contest, litigation [use of courts for 
political struggle]) 
Unconventional Politics  
II.  Oppression (Manipulation of 
competitive electoral process, 
censorship, surveillance, 
harassment, discrimination, 
infiltration of opposition, misuse of 
emergency legislation) 
II.   Non-violent Action (Social protest for 
political persuasion of rulers and 
masses; demonstrations to show 
strength of public support; non-
cooperation, civil disobedience, and 
other forms of non-violent action) 
Violent Politics  
III.  Violent Repression for                          
control of state power 
III.1.  (Political Justice.  Political 
 Imprisonment) 
III. 2.  Assassination 
III. 3.  State-terrorism (torture, death 
 squads, disappearances, 
 concentration camps) 
III. 4.  Massacres 
III. 5.  Internal War 
III. 6. Ethnocide/Politicise/Genocide  
III. Use of Violence for contestation 
challenging state power 
III. 1. Material destruction 
III. 2.  Assassination. (Individuated 
political murder) 
III. 3.  Terrorism (De-individuated 
political murder) 
III. 4.  Massacres 
III. 5.  Guerrilla Warfare 
III. 6.  Insurgency, Revolution (if 
successful). 
State of War  
* See Schmid et al. (1998: 58-9)  . 
 
‘what a legitimate authority plants, gives its citizen and neighbours, it would 
cultivate it from their plantation’.12 Peace will bring peace (Shain, 1995); 
war brings war (Hamdorf, 2000).  Peace is the end product of freedom, 
achieved through political communication defined as ‘the ability of people 
to express their views, thoughts, and beliefs freely, without the fear that they 
will be imprisoned as a result’13 in that political system. This political 
                                                 
12 A Turkish saying. 
13 Sharansky (2002), He states that ‘(w)e must understand that it is not only individuals who are equal, but 
also the nationalities of this world that are equal. They all deserve to live in democracy, to live under a 
government that depends on them.’ Windsor agrees with Sharansky and states that ‘promoting 
democratization in the closed societies of the Middle East can provide a set of values and ideas that offer a 
powerful alternative to the appeal of the kind of extremism that today has found expression in terrorist 
activity, often against U.S. interests (Windsor, 2003).  
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communication is possible in liberal democratic systems and not in non-
democratic political systems. 
As Windsor notes, ‘democratic institutions and procedures, by 
enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels 
for participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying 
conditions that have fueled’ (Windsor, 2003) radicalisation and terrorism. 
5. Economic and social roots 
5.1. Economic roots 
Do economic conditions fuel terrorism? The answer varies: on the one 
hand, ‘plenty of commentary and some academic scholarship suggest that 
economic conditions like poverty and income inequality very much matter 
for terrorism by affecting levels of deprivation, feelings of injustice, and 
hence political tension’(Burgoon, 2004). On the other hand, some other 
scholars agree that it is difficult to establish a direct link between terrorism 
and economic conditions (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003a).  
Terrorism is a political problem and it is not an economic problem. 
However, politics affects the economy through the design of economic 
policies. If these policies create more injustice, income inequality and 
poverty, then those people who are suffering because of those polices will 
raise their voices against the politicians. Therefore, there is a link between 
economic conditions and terrorism, although it is not a direct one.  
Some economists, notably William Landes, Todd Sandler, and Walter 
Enders, have applied the economic model of crime to transnational 
terrorism. …the economic model yields few concrete predictions insofar as 
the relationship between market opportunities and participation in terrorism 
is concerned, because participation in terrorist acts by individuals with 
different characteristics depends on the probability that participation will 
bring about the desired political change, as well as the differential payoff for 
the various groups associated with achieving the terrorists' desired aims 
versus the penalties associated with failure. It is possible, for example, that 
well-educated individuals will disproportionately participate in terrorist 
groups if they think that they will assume leadership positions if they 
succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the terrorist 
organization than less-educated individuals (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003a;  
Enders and Sandler, 2004). 
This kind of assumption relies on ‘the problem of terrorism that treats 
the individual decision to engage in terrorist activities as a rational choice 
calculus, which is largely in line with empirical evidence’(Schnellenbach, 
2005). Therefore, economic conditions do have an impact on the roots 
causes of terrorism, but this does not necessarily mean that poor people will 
be involved in terrorism more than the rich, or that poor countries will have 
more terrorism than rich ones.   
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Instead of viewing terrorism as a response -- either direct or indirect --
 to poverty or ignorance, I suggest that it is more accurately viewed as a 
response to political conditions and longstanding feelings of indignity and 
frustration that have little to do with economic circumstances. I suspect that 
is why international terrorist acts are more likely to be committed by people 
who grew up under repressive political regimes (Krueger and Maleckova, 
2003b). 
Consequently, the political conditions, not the economic ones, are the 
determining factor in the root causes of terrorism. When economic 
conditions deteriorate and the public’s standard of living declines, unhappy 
political groups will begin organising political protests. The response to 
these protests plays a vital role. Traditionally, government prefers one of 
two choices: an oppressive way or a democratic way, which ‘gradually 
adheres to their demands’(Testas, 2002). The oppressive way may be 
counter-productive and create more problems than it solves. 
5.2. Issues of poverty 
Can poverty and inequalities be causes of terrorism? Indirectly, as 
noted above, the answer is yes, because poverty and inequalities are 
representatives of injustice. If there is no justice, people are ready to fight 
for it.  
Some studies on this topic say that ‘(p)overty per se is not a direct 
cause of terrorism’ (Gurr, 2005). One does not entirely agree with them, 
because as they in fact admit: ‘terrorism can occur anywhere, but it is more 
common in developing societies, rather than in poor or rich countries, and is 
most likely to emerge in societies characterized by rapid modernization 
(Bjorgo et al., 2007; Gurr, 2005). The investigation cited was on terrorist 
action and individual terrorists rather than roots of terrorism. It is obvious 
that a terrorist is unlikely to be a truly poor person, because such a poor 
person needs to concentrate on getting food and shelter rather than on 
challenging the existing political system in order to bring a better one. 
Terrorists, especially terrorist leaders, are more likely to be at least from a 
middle class background and sufficiently well educated to be able to 
understand a group’s aims and objectives. To act, the terrorist needs to be 
mature enough to take responsibility. In other words, he should be a 
psychologically fit and normal person. Leaders of almost all political 
organizations including militant movements are better educated and of 
higher status than most of the population from which they come. The reason 
might be that ‘more educated people from privileged backgrounds are more 
likely to participate in politics, probably in part because political 
involvement requires some minimum level of interest, expertise, 
commitment to issues and effort, all of which are more likely if people have 
enough education and income to concern themselves with more than 
minimum economic subsistence’ (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003a).  
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Having said that, violence increases when important assets in societies 
are not equally distributed. If there is relative fairness in the distribution of 
wealth and justice, the use of violence is unlikely to be considered as an 
option. However, if there is not fairness and justice or the distribution of 
important assets is not equal, then the individual may consider the use of 
violence. One of the aims of violence is to alter the political and economic 
status quo, because these are seen to be maintaining the injustice and 
unfairness. Hence, the use of violence ‘becomes more attractive to those that 
are excluded from the state apparatus – the prize of victory raises with 
inequality (Boix, 2004).  
Leaders of terrorist groups such as the PKK, IRA and Palestinian 
groups exploit poverty in their respective communities.  Poverty therefore 
does play a vital, if indirect, role in the process of terrorism. For example, 
Northern Ireland, the Basque region, and the Eastern part of Turkey are 
relatively poor parts of their respective countries. They are also, where 
terrorists have come from, and many of the people of those regions have 
supported and recruited terrorists. Any investigation of the terrorist activities 
in these regions which does not include these regions’ economic and social 
conditions will be incomplete.  
Groups which are relatively disadvantaged because of class, ethnic, or 
religious cleavages within countries, often support terrorist movements. 
Terrorist leaders will, as previously mentioned, most likely be educated and 
middle-class, but ‘(r)ecruits are also drawn from among poorer and less-
educated youth – those with a lack of opportunities to complete secondary or 
higher education, or unable to find good jobs’ (Gurr, 2005). In short, 
inequalities and injustice within a country may become a breeding ground 
for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically (Gurr, 
2005).  
Economic change creates conditions that are conducive for instability 
in every part of the world. If the economic change is perceived by the 
community to be good for everybody, this obviously will not help any 
militant movements and extremist ideologies. If the economic change harms 
a specific region of the country and people are not sharing the burden, the 
sense of injustice will create new political opponents.  
However, economic changes are not exactly the obvious and 
immediate causes of any conflicts. There needs to be a compelling process 
of interpretation or reinterpretation, which makes people perceive economic 
change as a manifestation of greedy or power-hungry conspiracies.  
Often the socio-economic causes are combined with very real but 
isolated instances of humiliation and exploitation to form the "evidence" for 
larger interpretations. To be effective, moreover, interpretations require 
potent interpreters, leaders and organizations capable of galvanizing people 
into action. This role of parties, demagogues, and dynamic revolutionary 
organizations can even seize power, for example, when a state has been 
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overwhelmed by external enemies in war, or by an overload of major 
problems and enemies within (Merkl, 2000).  
The economic changes may be used by groups in order to justify their 
aims and objectives. All economic changes will have an impact on the 
future. But as nobody knows for certain what the future holds, everything 
depends on the interpretation of those changes.  
5.3. The welfare state 
‘If your enemies are hungry - feed them (Romans 12:20).’ Social 
justice is an important factor in the society. If there is social justice, the 
society is solid and united. People can trust each other and try to keep peace 
rather resort than to violence. If the distribution of wealth is not equal and 
politicians favour some group or class, this will eventually offend the others. 
This is true not only within countries, but also of the world economy. 
For that reason, early in 2003, Britain's Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, Patricia Hewitt, said, ‘If we in the West don't create a system of 
world trade that is fair as well as free … we will pay a price in increased 
terrorism and increased insecurity.’ In reality, it is an irony that while its 
supposed benefits are increasing, the fruits of the global economy are far 
from equitably distributed. Western consumerism in all its elusive bloated 
glory is benefiting from this, while the streets of third world cities are lined 
with hoardings merely holding out the promise of the same. Consequently, 
for the vast majority, the gulf between their daily reality and the riches so 
displayed is unimaginably huge, (Porritt and Wright, 2003) which leads 
people into opposition to the wealthiest political systems.  
The gap between rich and poor has grown, and this unwelcome growth 
is apparently accelerating. According to the World Bank, of the six billion 
people on Earth, three billion live on less than $2 a day, and 1.2 billion live 
on less than $1 a day, which defines the absolute poverty standard. Access to 
clean water is denied to 1.5 billion people. Meanwhile, the world's richest 
200 people are worth an average of $5 billion each. This naturally increases 
envy and anger. 
The instability of economies and politics erodes a sense of national 
identity, and therefore decreases stability and makes conditions ripe for 
fundamentalism. When nations cannot take care of their people, people lose 
confidence in them and often tend not to vote, because they are not pleased 
with any of the candidates. The growing influence of extreme right-wing 
parties in Western European countries certainly indicates that the problem of 
extremism and fundamentalism is not just limited to poor countries (Lovin, 
2003). 
It is worth mentioning here the findings of research about the 
relationship between the social welfare system and terrorism.   
According to Table 4, there is a link between income inequality, 
poverty, economic insecurity and terrorism. The starting point of these links  
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Table 4  
‘Social Welfare Policies, and the Preferences and Capacities for Terrorism*  
 
*See  Burgoon, 2004. 
 
is the social welfare policies, which depend on the decisions of the 
government. According to the researcher, ‘both narrow and broader 
conceptions of social welfare policy can be expected to reduce poverty, 
inequality, political-religious extremism, and general economic insecurity 
that, in turn, shape preferences for terrorism; but at the same time, social 
policy can be expected to increase capacities to organize and carry-out 
terrorism’ (Burgoon,2004). One can draw the conclusion from this table that 
welfare policies, if adequately funded, might reduce terrorism. If they exist, 
but are not adequately funded, they could increase terrorism.   
6. Ideological and religious roots 
6.1. Ideological roots 
According to Kullberg and Jokinen, ‘terrorism is not an ideology as 
such. It has no united political agenda. In principle, almost any ideology 
could be claimed by a terrorist’(Kullberg and Jokinen, 2004). Terrorism uses 
ideology as a tool for participating in relations with an audience who 
believes in that ideology and for influencing the wider public. In other 
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words, ‘terrorism needs an all-encompassing philosophy, a religion or 
secular ideology, to legitimize violence, to win recruits to the cause and to 
mobilize them for action’(Richardson, 2006).   
Human beings seek to justify whatever they do. The justification can 
be done with ideological and religious teaching. People who belong to 
different groups in society feel forced to position themselves in relation to 
two opposing poles. The opposing concepts of the others have such 
powerful meanings that they tend to supersede other conflicts and determine 
how these conflicts are interpreted, mobilised around, and fought over 
(Bjørgo et al., 2004). 
6.2. Religious roots 
Religion per se is not a direct cause of terrorism, but people can find 
justification for terrorism in religion. ‘Religiosity itself is not a cause of 
political radicalism. Appeals to religion are likely to be a way of framing or 
representing a struggle in terms that a potential constituency will understand 
rather than the determinants of a strategic choice’. Juergensmeyer says that  
while religion has been a major factor in recent acts of terrorism, it is 
seldom the only one. Religious ideologies, goals, and motivations are 
often interwoven with those that are economic, social, and political. A 
group’s decision to turn to violence is usually situational and is seldom 
endemic to the religious tradition to which the group is related. Islam 
does not cause terrorism, nor does any other religion with which terrorist 
acts have been associated. As John Esposito explained, usually ‘political 
and economic grievances are primary causes or catalysts, and religion 
becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize’. Ian Reader stated that even 
in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the Buddhist movement implicated in the 
Tokyo nerve gas incident in 1995, the religious factor ‘would not have 
been enough to take the group in the direction that it did’(Juergensmeyer, 
2006). 
Because there are terrorists who claim that they belong to a certain 
religion, many may call them ‘religious terrorists’ (e.g. ‘Islamic terrorists’).  
Nevertheless, at the same time millions who also belong to that same 
religion are not terrorists, and even denounce terrorism. Therefore, the tiny 
proportion of violent people should not be seen as representing their 
religion. Therefore, ‘any political ideology, or opinion, cannot be 
terrorism’(Kullberg and Jokinen, 2004). Terrorism can be the means used in 
the name of some ideology by terrorist groups, but that ideology is not 
terrorism (Kullberg and Jokinen, 2004). ‘Interviews with terrorist often 
reveal their sense of frustration bred of failure. Religion provides them with 
a means of dealing with these personal issues in a way that address their 
particular inadequacies by making them part of a more powerful movement 
and promising ultimate victory (Richardson, 2006).  In short, religion may 
enable people to deal with their frustrations, but it is not the root cause of 
those frustrations.   
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6.3. Psychological roots 
None of the research undertaken on the issue of the psychological 
roots of terrorism has proved that there is a link between personal 
psychology and terrorism. ‘Terrorism is an extremely complex and diverse 
phenomenon’ (Post, 2006) which might have different and diverse causes. 
Hence, there is no unified general theory, which leads people to explain 
terrorists’ psychology: their motivations, behaviours, leaderships, 
organisational dynamics and followers.  
Research that was carried out in the Unites State in the nineteen 
seventies and eighties about ‘terrorist personalities’ states that ‘the militants 
of underground organizations were described as infantile, mentally 
distressed, and terrorized by the external world; as defeated people or 
seeking to compensate for their failure by excluding themselves from 
society or seeking for revenge’ (Porta, 1995). In contrast, Crenshaw says 
that ‘the most relevant characteristics of terrorists are their normality’ 
(Crenshaw, 1981).  
Understanding terrorist psychology requires starting from the point 
where a person began his/her journey towards a world of terrorism. I have 
already said that terrorism is a process and its roots may go back some forty 
years. I think the environment of any particular individual has a key role in 
the decision of men and women when they turn to the world of terrorism. 
That environment is combining with political, social, economic and cultural 
factors. Each of them may have an effect on him or her differently and 
gradually. Their effects are psychological and inspirational.  
The psychological explanation of an individual terrorist indicates that 
terrorists are not clinically psychotic and depressed. While terrorism and 
membership of terrorist cells might have given some psychological help to 
those involved, ‘explanations at the level of individual psychology are 
insufficient’ (Post, 2006). Individual motivations are important, such as 
gaining of power, taking revenge and being an important figure in the 
organisation. However, ‘a clear consensus exists that it is not individual 
psychology, but group, organizational and social psychology that provides 
the greatest analytical power in understanding this complex phenomenon. 
Terrorists have subordinated their individual identity to the collective 
identity, so that what serves the group, organization or network is of primary 
importance’ (Post, 2006). 
It is easier to find recruits when there is an organisation of terrorists, 
which already exists, than it is when creating a new organisation. These new 
recruits can be anyone who might have been emotionally disturbed, 
alienated, and/or a frustrated individual. But it is the initial stage of the 
formation of the terrorist cell which holds the key for making a proper 
explanation of the causes of terrorism. It is clear that at the initial stage of 
the formation of terrorism, the individual should be psychologically fit, 
educated and economically sound. Without these qualities, he cannot 
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organise any activities or cell in the first place. The question is here, what 
psychological factors may drive him to do this? The answer may be 
frustration, loss of belief in the authorities, anger, and seeing himself as a 
saviour.  This person can be a leader of a terrorist cell, which has the 
potential to develop. 
After the initial stage, it is important to differentiate followers from 
leaders. The leader has a very important role in organising the cell and 
encouraging people to join the organisation. He should be a good speaker in 
order to unify the group, and a good conveyer of messages that are drawn 
from politics, ideology or culture, in order to educate the followers. ‘The 
leader also plays a crucial role in identifying the external enemy as the 
cause, and drawing together into a collective identity otherwise disparate 
individuals, who may be discontented and aggrieved’ (Post, 2006). The 
leader persuades believers to die for their cause, while also restraining them 
from competing with each other to die prematurely.   
Followers of the leader do not need to play any crucial role; they just 
need to have capability to complete their given role properly. These people 
can be estranged students, youth or unhappy people. They are forced by the 
political system into the kinds of psychological conditions which make them 
ready to receive the leaders of the terrorists’ products. Take, for example, 
the statement: ‘Our message to you is crystal clear: Your salvation will only 
come in your withdrawal from our land, in stopping the robbing of our oil 
and resources, and in stopping your support for the corrupt and corrupting 
leaders’ (BBC, 4 August 2005). When an Arab youth or student listens to 
this statement, he might believe that the statement is true, and that 
consequently he is compelled to respond positively. Therefore, 
‘understanding each terrorism in a nuanced manner within its own particular 
cultural, historical and political context’ is important (Post, 2006).  In short, 
the political, social, economic and cultural environments have a paramount 
role in determining whether people participate in terrorism.  
All humans seem to need recognition of their worth.  This is a basic 
psychological need. Philosopher John Rawls noted that ‘the most important 
primary good is self-respect’ (Rawls, 1995: 125).  Self-respect depends on 
external recognition.  The search for recognition is therefore important in the 
development of the terrorist.  
The desire for recognition may at first appear be an unfamiliar concept, 
but it is as old as the tradition of Western political philosophy, and 
constitutes a thoroughly familiar part of the human personality. It was 
first described by Plato in the Republic, when he noted that there were 
three parts to the soul, a desiring part, a reasoning part, and a part that he 
called thymos, or “spiritedness.” Much of human behaviour can be 
explained as a combination of the first two parts, desire and reason: desire 
induces men to seek things outside themselves, while reason or 
calculation shows them the best way to get them. But in addition, human 
beings seek recognition of their own worth, or of the people, things, or 
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principles that they invest with worth. The propensity to invest the self 
with a certain value, and to demand recognition for that value, is what in 
today’s popular language we would call “self-esteem.” The propensity to 
feel self-esteem arises out of the part of the soul called emos. It is like an 
innate human sense of justice. People believe that they have a certain 
worth, and when other people treat them as though they are worth less 
than that, they experience the emotion of anger. Conversely, when people 
fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they feel shame, and when they 
are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel pride. The 
desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, 
and pride, are parts of the human personality critical to political life 
(Blunden, 1992).  
Once people have decided to participate in terrorist cells, ‘the process 
of becoming a terrorist involves a cumulative, incrementally sustained and 
focused commitment to the group’ (Post, 2006). In addition, there is a 
continuing enhancement by leaders or other recruiters, educating, brain 
washing, and justifying fighting against a created enemy. When a person 
joins the cell, his psychology will be continually drawn towards extremes, 
because the cell is a form of closed group and his previous knowledge about 
what is right and wrong and belief will gradually be replaced with the 
group’s knowledge, beliefs and collective identity. When this process has 
been completed, the person has become ready for use. 
Leaving the terrorist organisation is a self-realisation process. When 
someone joined a terror cell, he might have had sets of beliefs and hopes 
about changing the environment. As time passes, his beliefs and hopes may 
gradually fade, and then that person would like to leave, but doing so is not 
easy. He needs to be brave enough to take risks with his life, which comes 
under threat because his group will not let him go, as their lives in turn come 
under threat when he has gone.   
7. Conclusion 
Understanding the root causes of terrorism helps us to understand the 
phenomenon of terrorism and may give us the right idea of how to prevent 
and combat it. Truly, ‘terrorism researchers and analysts and counter 
terrorism policy makers need to be able to understand the much broader 
trends in terrorism and their possible strategic implications and impact both 
for their own societies and for the international community, and the relative 
significance of specific trends or types of terrorism in global terms’ 
(Wilkinson, 2000). 
This paper evaluated various aspects of possible causes of terrorism. 
After careful analyses, this paper shows that the root causes of terrorism is 
political. In other words, the decision makers of any political system whom 
leave certain numbers of people unsatisfied about their decisions which may 
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lead them into frustration which trigger political disobedience and political 
violence. One of forms of political violence is terrorism.  
In order to establish a link between terrorism and other roots such as 
historical and political systems, economic and social roots, ideological and 
religious roots and psychological roots. However, intended link has not been 
established between terrorism and economics, ideological, religious and 
psychological roots. Thus, we have seen, the psychological roots are 
unproven; terrorism does not appear to be the product of psychological 
illness.  Similarly, ideology has a role to play in keeping people moving 
together towards the same aims and objectives, but it is a tool to be used to 
communicate with the community in order to recruit more support, rather 
than being itself the root cause of terrorism.  Poverty may have a link to 
terrorism, but it is not direct.  Economic and other grievances only lead to 
terrorism if people feel that those grievances are a product of the political 
system, and they are excluded from that system. As Richardson says, ‘Broad 
social, economic and cultural factors may be the underlying causes or rather 
the risk factors that make a society more or less susceptible to the appeal of 
terrorist groups. But they are not the cause’ (Richardson, 2006). 
However, the paper has proved that there is a direct link between 
terrorism political system and political regimes. Demands of politically 
dissident groups are political neither economic or ideological or religious.  
The Table 4 clearly indicates that welfare of people and terrorism may have 
a link, but this is not a cause of terrorism, it is fuelling of terrorism. It is 
obvious that welfare policies are the decision of governments, that is, 
political decision.     
For example, before Spanish nation building process began, Basque  
country and other provinces enjoyed political autonomy from Madrid for 
many years. Since the establishment of new Spanish state, the demands of 
the Basque Country have not been fully met by the decision makers of 
Madrid which caused terrorism of the Basques, because ‘the fact that 
intensely felt ethnic sentiments and political interests could not be expressed 
through legitimate channels led growing frustration among younger 
Basques’ (Shabad and Ramo,  1995). That lead those youths to join ETA 
which engaged terrorism for many years. This example provides a clear 
evidence what causes terrorism which is political decision and system.  
In short, the root causes of terrorism are political systems and political 
administration and policies. This means that any suggestions to solve the 
problem of terrorism will not be successful unless they address the political 
system. 
116                                          Bekir ÇINAR 
References 
BERGESEN, A. J. and LIZARDO, O. A. (2007), “Types of Terrorism by World System 
Location”, Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 
http://www.nd.edu/~olizardo/papers/terrorloc.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2007.  
BJØRGO, T., CARLSSON, Y. and HAALAND, T. (2007), “Hate Crime or Gang Conflict? 
Violence between Youth Group in a Norwegian City”, at http://www.fpvv.uni-
mb.si/conf2004/papers/bjorgo.pdf, accessed on 24 May 2007. 
BLUNDEN, A. (1992), “By Way of an Introduction”, in F. Fukuyama, The End of History and 
the Last Man, Penguin, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/ 
works/us/fukuyama.htm, accessed on 24 February 2005. 
BOIX, C. (2004), “Political Violence”, Paper prepared for the Yale Conference on Order, 
Conflict and Violence, April 30th-May 1st. 
BRIGGS, R.  FIESCHI, C. and LOWNSBROUGH, H. (2006), Bringing it Home: Community-
based Approaches to Counter-Terrorism, London: Demos.  
BURGOON, B. (2004), “On Welfare and Terror Social Welfare Policies and Political-
economic Roots of Terrorism”, ASSR Working paper 04/07 (September), Amsterdam 
School for Social Science Research at http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/assr/frdocs/ 
wp/downloads/ASSR-WP0407.pdf, 17 August. 
CHWE, M. S.-Y. (2001), “Is communal violence generally susceptible to contagion effects?” 
Workshop on the Dynamics of Communal Violence,  Center on Social and Economic 
Dynamics, The Brookings Institution, Department of Politics, New York University, 
michael@chwe.net, www.chwe.net, January 2001. 
ÇINAR, B. (1997),  Devlet Güvenliği, Đstihbarat ve Terörizm (State Security, Intelligence and 
Terrorism), Ankara: SAM Yayınları. 
CRENSHAW, M. (1981), “The Cause of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379-99. 
————(2005), “Political Explanations”, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de 
Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, I, 12-18. 
DAVIS, G. G. (2007), “Repression, Rationality and Relative Deprivation; A theoretical and 
empirical examination of Cross-National Variations in Political Violence”, 
http://economics.gmu.edu/working/WPE_99/99_04.pdf, accessed on 15 Mar. 07.  
DERMER, R. (2006), “Preface to the Paperback Edition”, in N. Sharansky, The Case for 
Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror, New York: 
Public Affairs. 
DERSHOWITZ, A. (2002), Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to 
the Challenge, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
ENDERS, W. and SANDLER,T. (2004), “After 9/11: Is It All Different Now?” April 2004, 
accessed on 7.08.2005,  and http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/carnegie/papers/sandler.pdf, 
accessed on 28 May 2007. 
FRANKS, J. (2007), “Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Orthodox Terrorism Theory and 
Beyond”, http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/franks.pdf, accessed on 16 March 2007.  
GAUSE, III, F. G. (2005), “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?”, Foreign Affairs, 
September/October, and http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-
gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism.html, accessed on 6 March 2007. 
GURR, T. R. (2005), “Economic Factors”, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de 
Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism,  I, 19-26.  
HAMDORF, D. (2000), “Reduced view of a multidimensional reality: The Northern Ireland 
peace treaty in Berliner Zeitung – an example of peace journalism?” at 
Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz Nr. 51/2000 
Online: http//www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/serials/kempf/htm. 
HOMER-DIXON, T. (2007), “Why Root Causes are Important?”, submitted to the Toronto 
Globe and Mail, September 23, 2001, and http://www.wfs.org/mmdixon.htm, 
accessed on 3 March.  
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 117 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers_Party, accessed on 15 Mar. 07. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on 3 March 
2007. 
http://polisci.nelson.com/violence.html, accessed on 28 May 2007. 
JOHNSON, P.M. (2007), The online edition of A Glossary of Political Economy Terms and 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/nation_state, accessed on 15 Mar. 07. 
PORRITT, J. and WRIGHT, M. (2003), “Prospects For Peace: Sustainable and Security”, 
Resurgence, Issue: 218 May / June, from http://www.resurgence.org/resurgence/ 
issues/ porritt218.htm, accessed on 28 May 2007 
JUERGENSMEYER, M. (2005), “Religion”, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de 
Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 1, 27-34. 
KEANE, J. (2004),Violence and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
KRUEGER, A. B. and MALECKOVA, J. (2003a), “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a 
Causal Connection?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (4), 119–44. 
————(2003b), “Seeking the Roots of Terrorism”, The Chronicle Review, 49, 39, 6 June, 
p. B10. 
————(2008), “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty 
Cause Terrorism?”, The New Republic Online at http://www.alanalexandroff.com/nr-
krueger.pdf, accessed on 30 July. 
KULLBERG, A. and JOKINEN, C. (2004), “From Terror to Terrorism: the Logic on the Roots 
of Selective Political Violence”, Research Unit for Conflicts and Terrorism, 
University of Turku, Finland, The Eurasian Politician, 19th July. 
LAQUEUR, W. (1996), Fascism: Past, Present and Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
LEEMAN, R. W. (1987), “Rhetoric and Values in Terrorism” in M. Slann and B. 
Schechterman (eds.), Multidimensional Terrorism, Inc.: Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 45-53.  
LOVIN, A. (2003), “Real Security”, Resurgence, Issue: 218 (May), from 
http://www.resurgence.org/resurgence/issues/porritt218.htm, accessed on 28 May 
2007. 
MAZRUI, A. A. (2007), “Towards Understanding the Causes of Terrorism: the Culture, the 
Mission, the Motive and the Target”, http://www.un-
globalsecurity.org/pdf/mazrui.pdf, accessed on 27 May 28,  
MERKL, P. (2000), “Defining Extremism”, presented in a conference of Drawing the Legal 
Line, Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World: Focus on Extremism, 
18-22 September 2000, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. 
MOLLOV, B. (2005), “Religion and Religious Extremism”, International Summit on 
Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005, Madrid, at http://english.safe-
democracy.org/keynotes/religion-and-religious-extremism.html, accessed on 3 March 
2007. 
PAPE, R. (2005), A Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks.  
PORTA, D. D. (1995), Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
POST, J. M.  (2005), “Psychology”, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de 
Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 1, 7-12.  
RAWLS, J. (1995), “Self Respect, Excellences, and Shame”, in R. S. Dillon (ed.), Dignity, 
Character, and Self Respect, New York and London: Routledge. 
RICHARDSON, L. (2006), What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorists Threat, John 
Murray: Great Britain.  
RICHMOND, O. P.  (2003), “Realizing Hegemony? Symbolic Terrorism and the Roots of 
Conflict”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26(4), 289–309. 
ROMANS 12:20. 
118                                          Bekir ÇINAR 
ROTBERG, R. (2002), “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, The Washington Quarterly, 
Summer 2002, 25 (3), 85-96 and  http://www.twq.com/02summer/ rotberg.pdf, 
accessed 15 Mar. 07.  
SCHMID,  A. P. et al. (1988), Political Terrorism, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
SCHNELLENBACH, J. (2005), “Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing 
terrorist activity”, Philipps-University Marburg Department for Public Economics: 
Am Plan 2 35037 Marburg, Germany,  
SHABAD, G. and RAMO, F. J. L. (1995), “Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque 
Terrorism in Spain” in M. Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context, Penn State Press, 
410-72. 
SHARANSKY, N. (2006), The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome 
Tyranny and Terror, New York: Public Affairs. 
————(2002), Democracy for Peace’, Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute. 
SHAIN, Y.  (1995), “Multicultural Foreign Policy”, Foreign Policy, 100 (Fall),  69-87. 
SILKE, A. (1998), “Terrorism”, The Psychologist, 14(11), 580-1. 
STARR, K. (2007), “The Role of Civil Disobedience in Democracy” CLMP News, Summer 
'98 Issue at http://www.civilliberties.org/sum98role.html, accessed on 24 May 2007 
TAY, S., O, BRIEN, R. and WATSON, B. (2004), “Situational factors contributing to the 
expression of aggression on the roads”, IATSS Research, 28 (1), 2004101-107; and 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00002167/01/watson_IATSS.pdf, accessed on 15 
Mar. 07. 
TESTAS, A. (2002), “The Roots of Algeria’s Religious and Ethnic Violence”, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 25(2), 161–83. 
WALZER, M. (2002), “Five Questions About Terrorism”, Dissent, Winter, 5-9. 
WARNER, M. and CRISP, R. (1990), “Introduction”, in M. Warner and R. Crisp (eds.), 
Terrorism, Protest and Power, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1-14. 
WILKINS, B. (1992),  Terrorism and Collective Responsibility, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
WILKINSON, P.  (1974), Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan.  
————(1977), Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: Macmillan. 
————(2000), “The Strategic Implications of Terrorism”, Terrorism & Political 
Violence: A Sourcebook, by M.L. Sondhi (ed.), Indian Council of Social Science 
Research, India: Har-anand Publications, 19-49. 
WINDSOR, J. L. (2003), “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism”, The 
Washington Quarterly, Summer  26(3), 43–58. 
ZIMBARDO, P. G. (2001), “Opposing terrorism by understanding the human capacity for 
evil”, Monitor on Psychology, 32 (10), November and 
http://apa.org/monitor/nov01/humanevil.html, accessed on 3 March 2007. 
  
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 119 
Özet 
Terörizmin temel nedenleri 
Yazının amacı, terörizmin temel nedenlerini tartışmaktır. Bu nedenler, siyasal sistemler ile 
siyasal yönetim ve politikalar olabilir. Đleri sürülen görüş, terörizmin temel nedenleri bilinmeden, 
soruna makul bir çözüm bulunamayacağıdır. Buna ek olarak yazıda terörizmin temel nedenlerinin 
ekonomik, tuplumsal, ideolojik veya dinsel/inançsal olmayabileceği de kanıtlanmaya çalışılmıştır. 
Terörizmin ana teması, siyasal sistem ve eylemlerin ürünü olan adaletsizlik olabilir. Dolayısiyle 
terörizmin temel nedenleri araştırılırken önce siyasal sistem ve siyasal karar alma süreçleri 
incelenmelidir. Kısaca, terörizm sorununu çözmeyi amaçlayan öneriler, siyasal sistemin kendisine 
yönelmedikçe başarılı olamayacaktır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Terörizm, terörizmin önlenmesi, ana nedenler, demokrasi, zenginlik, adalet, 
adaletsizlik. 
 
 
